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Abstract. The verification of planning domain models is crucial to en-
sure the safety, integrity and correctness of planning-based automated
systems. This task is usually performed using model checking techniques.
However, directly applying model checkers to verify planning domain
models can result in false positives, i.e. counterexamples that are un-
reachable by a sound planner when using the domain under verification
during a planning task. In this paper, we discuss the downside of uncon-
strained planning domain model verification. We then propose a fail-safe
practice for designing planning domain models that can inherently guar-
antee the safety of the produced plans in case of undetected errors in
domain models. In addition, we demonstrate how model checkers, as
well as state trajectory constraints planning techniques, should be used
to verify planning domain models so that unreachable counterexamples
are not returned.
1 Introduction
Planning and task scheduling techniques are increasingly applied to real-world
problems such as activity sequencing, constraint solving and resource manage-
ment. These processes are implemented in planning-based automated systems
which are already used in space missions [17, 4, 1], search and rescue [14], logistics
[22] and many other domains. Since the failure of such systems could have catas-
trophic consequences, these applications are regarded as safety-critical. There-
fore, verification methods that are robust, trustworthy and systematic are crucial
to gain confidence in the safety, integrity and correctness of these systems.
The literature is rich with studies on verification of planning systems. For
instance, Smith et al. [20] carried out scenario-based testing and model-based
validation of the remote agent that controlled the Deep Space 1 mission. Another
example is the verification of the safety of the autonomous science agent design
that was deployed on the Earth Orbiter 1 spacecraft [5].
A typical planning system consists of a planning domain model, planning
problem, planner, plan, executive, and monitor. Planners take as an input a do-
main model which describes application-specific states and actions, and a prob-
lem that specifies the goal and the initial state. From these inputs, a sequence
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of actions that can achieve the goal starting from the initial state is returned as
plan. The plan is then executed by an executive to change the world state to
match the desired goal.
Our research focuses on the verification of planning domain models wrt. safety
properties. Domain models provide the foundations for planning. They describe
real-world actions by capturing their pre-conditions and effects. Due to modelling
errors, a domain model might be inconsistent, incomplete, or inaccurate. This
could cause the planner to fail in finding a plan or to generate unrealistic plans
that will fail to execute in the real world. Moreover, erroneous domain models
could lead planners to produce unsafe plans that, when executed, could cause
catastrophic consequences in the real world.
This paper addresses the fact that the state-of-the-art verification methods
for planning domain models are vulnerable to false positive counterexamples. In
particular, unconstrained verification tasks might return counterexamples that
are unreachable by planners. Such counterexamples can mislead designers to
unnecessarily restrict domain models, thereby potentially blocking valid and
possibly necessary behaviours. In addition, false positive counterexamples can
lead verification engineers to overlook counterexamples that are reachable by
planners.
To overcome these deficiencies, we propose to employ planning goals as con-
straints during verification. Thus, we introduce goal-constrained planning domain
model verification, a novel concept that eliminates unreachable counterexamples
per se. We formally prove that goal-constrained planning domain model verifi-
cation of safety properties is guaranteed to return reachable counterexamples if
and only if any exist. We also demonstrate two different ways to perform goal-
constrained planning domain model verification, one using model checkers and
the other using state trajectory constraints planning techniques. To the best
of our knowledge, this work is the first to recommend fail-safe planning domain
model design practice; introduce the concept of goal-constrained planning domain
model verification. and demonstrate how model checkers, as well as state trajec-
tory constraints planning techniques, can be used to perform goal-constrained
planning domain model verification
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, Section 2, contrasts
the concepts presented here with related work. Second, Section 3 discusses the
problem of unreachable counterexamples in planning domain model verification.
Third, Section 4 proposes a design practice for planning domain models that
can inherently guarantee domain model safety even in the case of undetected
modelling errors. A verification concept of planning domain models that avoids
returning unreachable counterexamples is presented in Section 5. Then, Sec-
tion 6 discusses the implementation of this concept on the Cave Diving planning
domain using Spin and MIPS-XXL. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and
suggests future work.
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2 Related Work
Closely related, but different, is the work by [2]. Their main objective is to treat
verification as a planning task, whereas our aim is to demonstrate how model
checkers and planners can be used for domain model verification. They proposed
to perform system model verification using classical planners. To do this, they
first translated the model of the system under verification into a planning do-
main model. Then, the negation of the safety property to be established, is used
as the goal for the planner, which is then consulted to find a plan that acts as
counterexample for the property. In our study, because our aim is to verify plan-
ning domain models, which are used by planners to find plans for specifics goals,
we used state trajectory constraints to restrict counterexamples to identify plans
that can achieve the planning goal while falsifying the safety property. Unlike [2],
where the negation of the safety property is used as the goal, in our verification
as planning method, the negation of the safety property is represented as state
trajectory constraint and the goal is the given planning goal.
[19] also apply verification as planning to verify planning domain models,
starting from LTL specifications. This work fundamentally differs from our work.
Raimondi et al. [19] focused their work on translating specification properties
into trap formulas which can help in testing the impact of individual atomic
propositions on the validity of the overall verified property. However, their method
does not consider the interaction between property testing and the original plan-
ning goal. Note that finding a planning constraint to exercise a specific atomic
proposition is not enough to ensure the constraint itself would be exercised dur-
ing the planning process. For example, a planning goal might be achieved through
a state trajectory that does not exercise the hard constraint used to represent
the tested property. Our work is mainly based on investigating this interac-
tion. Therefore, we used state trajectory constraints to guarantee the property
is tested while achieving the planning goal. Additionally, their work, just like
other similar methods, requires a complete planner to give deterministic results,
whereas our work, as discussed in Section 5, guarantees definite verification with-
out this requirement.
[11] also used classical planners for planning systems verification, but they
examined verifying plans rather than domain models. They proposed an ap-
proach that uses classical planners to find counterexamples for a given planning
problem and plan instance. Their work and ours are related in that both suggest
performing planning verification for a specific planning problem rather than at-
tempting unconstrained verification of a planning system. However, their work
is limited to the verification of single plan instances, whereas our method verifies
all potential plans that can be spun from a domain model for a specific goal and
initial state.
Among others, [18, 16, 21, 12, 3] used model checkers to verify planning
domain models. They translated the respective domain models into the input
language of the selected model checker. The model checker is then applied to
verify the domain model wrt. a given specification property. Similarly, we also
propose a method to verify domain models using model checkers. However, our
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method differs from the others in two aspects. First, in the way we define the
planning domain model verification problem, and, second, in the way we use
model checkers to perform verification. As explained in Section 5, we consider
the verification of planning domain models to be constrained by a specific goal
and initial state pair. In contrast, previous studies perform unconstrained verifi-
cation of domain models, i.e. leaving the goal and initial state open. As discussed
in Section 3, the ungrounded goal and initial state may cause the model checker
to return counterexamples that are unreachable when a planner uses the Domain
Under Verification (DUV). These unreachable counterexamples can mislead the
designers to over-restrict the DUV during the debugging process. On the other
side, when the goal and initial state are constrained for verification, then we have
shown that the returned counterexamples, if any, are guaranteed to be reachable
by any sound planner. The second difference is that, after the planning domain
model is translated to the model checker’s input language, we augment the model
transitions, introducing the negation of the goal as a new constraint that forces
the model checker to terminate once the goal is reached. This modification pre-
vents the model checker from returning counterexamples that falsify the given
property after satisfying the goal; these are unreachable by planners.
3 Unreachable counterexamples in planning domain
model verification
Planning domain model verification aims to demonstrate that any produced plan
satisfies a set of properties. To achieve this, formal planning domain model veri-
fication methods leave the planning goal open. This, we define as unconstrained
verification of planning domain models, i.e. the verification is expected to hold
for any potential goal.
unconstrained verification searches the domain model for a sequence of ac-
tions that can falsify the given property, regardless of any other conditions. In
particular, whether or not a planner would consider this sequence to be a plan,
is not taken into account. This is a critical oversight, because, when the domain
model is used to solve a specific planning problem, the sequence of actions that
constitutes such a counterexample might, in fact, be “pruned away” by the plan-
ner, if it does not satisfy the planning goal. Therefore, for a specific planning
problem, counterexamples that do not achieve the planning goal are deemed
unreachable counterexamples from the planner’s perspective.
To illustrate this, we use a modified version of the microwave oven example,
introduced in [6], as presented in Figure 1. A safety requirement would be that
the domain model does not allow the generation of erroneous plans, in LTL p0 =
G(¬Error), where G is the LTL globally operator. Unconstrained verification will
return 〈StartOven〉 as a counterexample that when applied to s0 will produce
s2 which is an error state. However, when this model is used to find a plan that
achieves the goal (g = Heat), this sequence will not be considered by the planner
as it does not lead to a state that achieves the goal. Moreover, we observe that the
valid plan 〈CloseDoor, StartOven〉 does satisfy the property p0, i.e. is error-free.
Goal-constrained planning domain model verification of safety properties 5
!Close
!Start
!Error
!Heat
S0
Close
!Start
!Error
!Heat
S1
!Close
Start
Error
!Heat
S2
Close
Start
!Error
Heat
S3
C
lo
se
D
oo
r
StartOven
StartOven
Fig. 1. Microwave oven FSM without reachable counterexample
Thus, the sequence 〈StartOven〉 from s0 to s2 is an unreachable counterexample
for the planner; it does not achieve the goal, nor is it part of a valid plan towards
the goal.
Counterexamples that are unreachable by planners exist in the literature. For
example, [21] used the Spin model checker to verify whether a planning domain
model would permit an automated planning system to select plans that would
waste resources and therefore not meet the mission’s science goals. To express
this requirement, they used “five data-producing activities must be scheduled by
any returned plan” as a property for model checking. The automated system
has two data-producing and two data-consuming activities, and a buffer that
can hold four data blocks. The goal of the planner is to schedule five data-
producing activity instances. The counterexample returned by the model checker
represented a plan with the two data-consuming activities scheduled before four
data-producing activities. This plan did not contain a fifth data-producing task,
because the data buffer was full after four data-producing activities and the only
two data-consuming tasks that would have cleared the buffer, were scheduled at
the beginning of the plan with no data in the buffer. Though the model checker
found a counterexample to falsify the property, we argue that any sound planner
would not generate such a plan, because it does not achieve the planning goal.
As such, this counterexample would have been pruned during the planner’s goal
search, and consequently, it would never have been returned as a plan, i.e. it is
unreachable for the planner, yet reachable by a goal-ignorant model checker.
The problem with unreachable counterexamples is that they mislead the
designer to unnecessarily restrict the domain model in the process of removing
them. Consequently, debugging is made harder and genuine counterexamples
could potentially be introduced in the process.
To overcome this, we observe that planning is performed for a specific goal
and initial state. To exploit this observation for domain model verification, we
propose to use the goal and initial state given to the planner as constraints to
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ensure that the counterexamples returned by a model checker, or other tools
used in this context, falsify the given property while also achieving the planning
goal. Thus, instead of performing unconstrained domain model verification, we
propose goal-constrained verification of planning domain models. The details of
this method are further explained in Section 5. Next, we describe an inherently
safe domain model design practice which can help to make domain models safer.
4 Inherently safe domain models
The ultimate objective of planning domain model verification is to ensure that
the plans produced by the verified domains satisfy a given specification. An al-
ternative and guaranteed way of achieving this goal is to extract plan constraints
from the specification, then include them in the domain model. A sound plan-
ner using this constrained domain model cannot produce any plan that could
violate these constraints. This idea was first noticed in 2005 [21] but was dis-
missed as it was not possible to describe overall plan constraints using PDDL
2.2. However, in 2006 Gerevini and Long [8] proposed an extension to the PDDL
2.2 language that allows the expression of plan state trajectory constraints. The
extended language, called PDDL3.0, was proposed for the fifth international
planning competition (IPC-5).
Smith et al. [21] provided an example of a system consisting of a camera,
solid-state recorder and a radio, and a requirement that for all plans, if an image
is taken and stored, then it is eventually uplinked. With the hard state trajectory
constraints, this property can be expressed as sometime-after((image is taken
and image is stored) image is uplinked). With this constraint, any sequence of
actions that does not respect this property would not be returned as a plan.
Though including specification properties in the domain model as strong
constraints is enough to guarantee that sound planners using the constrained
domain models will produce plans that meet the specification, this method will
not be able to find any errors in the domain model. Instead, it will just ensure
these errors, if any, are masked and prevented from affecting any plans that could
possibly be generated using the modified domain model. As such, this method
can be seen as a safety defence layer, a firewall, that prevents any potential
property violation. Nevertheless, note that undetected bugs in a domain model
could cause what would have been valid plans to be masked, thus unnecessarily
restricting the planner. Therefore, further verification efforts are needed to reveal
and rectify any underlying errors.
We consider including plan constraints in the domain model to be a good
practice to design inherently safe domain models. The effort of extracting formal
properties from the specification and inserting them as constraints in the domain
model is a small investment in return to the huge benefit of guaranteed safe plans,
i.e. plans that are safe “by construction”. This, together with our new concept of
goal-constrained verification, as introduced in the next section, can deliver safe
and error-free models.
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5 Goal-constrained verification of planning domain
models
Planning domain model verification covers different objectives, including the do-
main’s correctness, completeness, robustness, effectiveness and safety. The intent
of safety verification in this context is to verify that any plan produced from the
DUV will satisfy a given safety property. In other words, a domain is considered
safe if the domain is guaranteed only to produce plans that satisfy the given
safety property when used by a sound planner. This verification task can be
performed using advanced search algorithms, such as model checkers or classical
planners, to find a valid counterexample for the given safety property.
We define a valid counterexample to be a sequence of actions that, firstly, can
falsify the given safety property, secondly, can achieve the planning goal from the
given initial state, and, thirdly, none of the sub-sequences of the counterexample
can achieve the goal.
Formally, this is defined as follows: Let the planning problem P be a tuple
(D, s0, g), where D is the domain model that describes the set of all available
actions A, s0 is the initial state and g is the desired goal. pi is a solution to P ,
a plan, defined as a sequence of actions, where these actions are chosen from A.
pi = 〈a0, a1, ..., an〉 such that pi |= g i.e. when pi is applied to the initial state s0 it
yields a sequence of states S, S = 〈s0, s1, ..., sn〉 where the last state sn satisfies
the planning goal g, sn |= g. We say a plan pi satisfies a property p, pi |= p, if the
sequence of states S, generated by the plan pi, satisfies the property p, S |= p.
Furthermore, as defined in [10], we call a plan pi a redundant plan, if pi
contains a subsequence, pi′, pi′ | pi, that achieves the goal g.
Definition 1: A valid counterexample for a safety property, p, of a plan-
ning problem is a non-redundant plan, pi, that falsifies the safety property, pi 6|= p.
Plans are required to be non-redundant in the definition of valid counterex-
amples to exclude any plans that are enriched with action sequences which are
unnecessary to achieve the planning goal but required to falsify the given safety
property. Such plans represent counterexamples that are unreachable by any
sound planner when searching for a plan to achieve a given planning problem in
a planning task. Such plans represent counterexamples that are unreachable by
any sound planner.
To ensure the returned counterexamples are valid, we constrain the verifica-
tion problem with a goal and initial state, and we exclude any counterexample
that is a redundant plan. More formally, the verification problem associated with
planning task P is defined as the tuple V = (D, (s0, g), p). Where p is a formal
safety property extracted from a given specification and required to hold over
all valid paths that achieve the goal g from the initial state s0.
In this section, we introduced and formally defined the concept of goal-
constrained verification of planning domain models. In the following subsections,
we demonstrate how this concept can be realized using model checkers and state
trajectory constraints planning techniques.
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5.1 Goal-constrained planning domain model verification using
model checkers
Model checkers verify safety properties by searching for counterexamples that
falsify those properties. In the case of planning applications, any sequence of
actions that does not achieve the given goal, will be pruned by any sound planner.
Therefore, in the verification of planning problems, any counterexample that
does not achieve the goal of the planning problem should be eliminated on the
bases that this counterexample is unreachable by the planner.
To force model checkers to only return valid counterexamples, the safety
property is first negated and then joined with the planning goal in a conjunc-
tion. This conjunction is then negated and supplied to the model checker as an
input property. The final property requires the model checker to find a coun-
terexample that both, falsifies the safety property and satisfies the planning goal.
Note that, unlike Def. 1, this permits sequences that falsify the property after
satisfying the goal. However, once the goal is achieved, planners terminate the
search, thus rendering such sequences unreachable. To eliminate these sequences,
model transitions should be augmented with an additional guard, representing
the negation of the goal, to restrict all transitions once the goal is achieved.
With this modification, the model checker is forced to return counterexamples
that falsify the safety property before achieving the goal, because once the goal
is satisfied no further transitions will be permitted.
For a verification problem V = (D, (s0, g), p) we first translate the domain
model D into the model checker’s input language, obtaining the model M that
incorporates the initial state s0. Then, a model checker is applied to the verifi-
cation problem V ′ = (M,¬F (g)) to establish that
∃pi. pi |= F (g), (1)
where F is the LTL eventually operator.
The model M is modified to M ′ by augmenting the guards of all transitions
with the negation of the goal condition. The model checker is then applied to
the verification problem V ′′ = (M ′, p′) where p′ is defined as follows:
p′ = ¬
(
F (¬p) ∧ F (g)
)
(2)
There are two possible outcomes of the verification task V ′′. If the model
checker returns a counterexample, pi, then:
pi 6|= p′ (3)
≡ pi |= (F (¬p) ∧ F (g)) (4)
From the definition of the LTL eventually operator F :
∃i ≥ 0, si ∈ S, si |= ¬p (5)
∃j ≥ 0, sj ∈ S, sj |= g (6)
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It follows that there is at least one sequence S that falsifies the property p,
and there is a state sj in that sequence which satisfies the goal g, according to
(5) and (6). In addition to that, in the sequence S, p is guaranteed to be falsified
before g is satisfied, due to the modification we introduced in the model M ′.
Thus, the plan pi is a valid counterexample for the original safety property p as
per Def. 1. This proves that the DUV does not satisfy the safety property p with
respect to the goal and initial state.
The other potential outcome is that the model checker fails to find a coun-
terexample, then for all plans, pi:
pi |= p′ (7)
≡ pi 6|= (F (¬p) ∧ F (g)) (8)
It follows that pi 6|= F (¬p) ∨ pi 6|= F (g). Furthermore, from (1) we know that
∃pi. pi |= F (g). Therefore for all plans, pi:
pi 6|= F (¬p) (9)
≡ pi |= ¬(F (¬p)) (10)
≡ pi |= G(p) (11)
That means p is always true for all possible plans. Which proves that the DUV
satisfies the original property with respect to the goal and initial state.
5.2 Goal-constrained planning domain model verification using
planning techniques
Domain models can be verified to only produce valid plans, in terms of satisfying
given a property, for a specific goal and initial state pair using sound planners.
This is achieved by consulting the planner over the DUV to produce a plan that
can satisfy the goal and the negation of the property. If the domain model per-
mits producing plans that, along with achieving the goal, contradict the safety
property, then an unsafe plan can be found. Thus, the returned plan is a coun-
terexample that demonstrates that the safety property does not hold. On the
other hand, if the domain model does not permit the generation of plans that
can satisfy the negation of the safety property while achieving the goal, then the
planner will fail. Thus, the property holds in any plan produced for the given
goal.
A benefit of goal-constrained planning domain verification is, where a planner
is used to perform the verification task, there is no need to for this planner to
be complete, as long as the planner used for the verification is also the planner
that will be used during the planning task. This is because any counterexample
not found by that planner during verification, will then also not be reached by
the same planner during the planning task.
The following subsection provides a description of how state trajectory con-
straints can be used to verify planning domain models for a specific goal and
initial state.
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Goal-constrained planning domain verification using planning tech-
niques with state trajectory constraints The PDDL3.0 state trajectory
constraints, first mentioned in Section 4, can be used to perform planning do-
main model verification. First, the negation of the given property is expressed
using PDDL3.0 modal operators and embedded in the original domain model as
state trajectory constraint. The modified model is then used by a planner, as
described earlier, to perform the verification.
For a verification problem V = (D, (s0, g), p), we first apply a planner to the
planning problem P = (D, s0, g) to establish that there is a plan that solves P
∃pi. pi |= g. (12)
Then, the safety property p is negated and expressed in terms of PDDL3.0
modal operators as shown in [9]. The result is added as state trajectory constraint
to the original domain model.
Using the algorithm proposed in [7], the new model is transformed into a
PDDL2 compatible version. This is performed by first translating the state tra-
jectory constraint into a non-deterministic finite state automaton (NFA) which
can monitor property violations by inserting additional predicates and actions
conditional effects into the model to simulate and observe the behaviour of the
automaton that represents the constraint.
This yields a new planning problem P ′ = (D′, s′
0
, g′), where D′, s′
0
, g′ are
modified instances of D, s0, g that are supplemented with the additional predi-
cates and actions conditional effects of the automaton that represents the intro-
duced constraint. Then, a planner is applied to P ′ with two possible outcomes.
If the planner finds a plan then:
∃pi. pi |= g′ (13)
Since the satisfaction of g′ implies both, the satisfaction of the original goal g
at the last state of the sequence S, and the satisfaction of the state trajectory
constraint by the sequence S, (13) can be rewritten as
∃pi. pi |= g, pi |= ¬p. (14)
Furthermore, from (14) it follows that pi 6|= p, confirming that there is at least one
plan that achieves the goal while not respecting the safety property. Therefore,
this plan is a valid counterexample for that property as per Def. 1. Hence, the
DUV does not satisfy the property wrt. the planning goal and initial state.
Alternatively, if the planner fails to find a plan, then, as opposed to (14), we
have
∄pi. (pi |= g ∧ pi |= ¬p) (15)
≡ ∀pi. ¬(pi |= g ∧ pi |= ¬p) (16)
≡ ∀pi. (pi 6|= g ∨ pi 6|= ¬p) (17)
Given (12), (17) can be simplified to:
∀pi. pi 6|= ¬p ≡ ∀pi. pi |= p (18)
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Hence, all plans satisfy the safety property. Therefore, the property holds for the
planning domain model wrt. the given goal and initial state.
6 Example
In this section, we discuss how goal-constrained planning domain verification can
verify safety properties using both the Spin model checker [13] and the MIPS-
XXL planner [7]. We perform constrained and unconstrained verification tasks
to show how unlike the latter task our method does not return unreachable
counterexamples. As an example, we consider the classical cave diving plan-
ning domain taken from the Satisfying Track of the IPC-2014 [15]. The problem
consists of an underwater cave system with a finite number of partially inter-
connected locations. Divers can enter the cave from a specific location, entrance,
and swim from one location to an adjacent connected one. They can hold up to
four oxygen tanks and they consume one for every swim and take-photo action.
Only one diver can be in the cave at a time. Finally, divers have to perform a
decompression manoeuvre to go to the surface and this can be done only at the
entrance. Additionally, divers can drop tanks in or take tanks from any loca-
tion if they hold at least one tank or there is one tank available at the location
respectively.
The planning goals of this domain, as provided in the problem files in the
IPC-2014, consist of two parts. The first part dictates the required underwa-
ter location of which the photo is to be taken (we call it mission target) and
the second part which mandates the divers should return to the surface after
completing the mission (we call it safety target).
A critical safety property is that divers should not drown i.e. they should not
be in an underwater location, other than the entrance, where neither the divers
nor the location has one full oxygen tank at least.
To enable the planner and the model checkers to explore the entire state
space, we simplified this domain by ignoring the ”precludes” condition from the
original domain as it does not affect the verification of the drowning safety prop-
erty. Consequently, we considered only one diver and we modified some actions
to enable the diver to go back into the water after a dive. These modifications are
further explained in the commented simplified planning domain model PDDL
file which is provided along with the tasks problem PDDL and Promela files
online 1.
First, we translated the planning domain model from PDDL to Promela.
Thus, the verification results using the translated model only hold provided that
the translation is valid. The verification of the translation is outside the scope
and focus of this paper and left for future work.
In this example, the chosen planning goal is to have a photo of the first
location, L1, and to get the diver outside the water. The verification tasks are:
1 https://github.com/Anas-Shrinah/Goal-Constrained-Planning-Domain-
Verification-Example
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1 - Unconstrained verification with only the safety property: Both Spin and
MIPS-XXL found a counterexample 〈prepare-tank, enter-water, swim(L0, L1)〉.
Indeed, this counterexample leads the diver to a drowning state. At the end
of this sequence, the diver will be in underwater location L1 which is not the
entrance so they can not surface and with no oxygen tank to swim back to the
entrance. However, this is not a plan because it does not achieve any useful goal.
Therefore, it will not be produced by any sound planner when it is used in a
practical scenario (taking a photo of any location).
2- Verification with safety property and incomplete goal (mission target only):
Both Spin and MIPS-XXL returned 〈prepare-tank, prepare-tank, enter-water,
swim(L0, L1), take-photo〉. This counterexample achieves the goal and violates
the property. However, without the safety part of the goal, it would be possible to
generate plans that imply divers should swim to an underwater location and take
a photo of it without requiring the divers to return to the surface. These kind
of plans are illegal as they do not respect the safety part of the goal. Therefore,
such sequences are unreachable counterexamples i.e. will never be produced by
any sound planner while planning for a legal goal.
3- Verification using Spin with both safety property and proper goal but
without the augmented model M ′: Spin found a counterexample 〈prepare-tank,
prepare-tank, prepare-tank, prepare-tank, enter-water, swim(L0, L1), take-photo,
swim(L1, L0), decompress, enter water, swim(L0, L1)〉. This counterexample ach-
ieves the goal and violates the safety property but only after the goal is achieved.
Therefore, this is also an unreachable counterexample because a sound planner
will terminate after achieving the goal and any counterexample that violates the
property after achieving the goal will not be returned. Hence, it is unreachable.
4- Goal-constrained planning domain verification, as presented in this paper,
the result was: No plan is returned by the planner MIPS-XXL with complete
exploration and no counterexample is returned by Spin with exhaustive verifica-
tion mode. This means the planning domain model has no provision of producing
a plan that can violate the safety property before achieving the goal. I.e. this
model is safe with respect to the given property and goal pair.
Though the counterexamples returned by the incomplete verification tasks
number one, two and three are obviously unreachable and should not misguide
the designers to overcomplicate the model, in a real world sized application such
unreachable counterexamples can be critical and much more diffcult to recognise
and avoid. We expect that our proposed concept can save practitioners a huge
amount of person-hours trying to alter planning domain models for behaviours
that their planners will never experience in practice.
7 Conclusions and future work
The verification of planning domain models is essential to guarantee the safety
of planning-based automated systems. Unreachable counterexamples returned
by unconstrained planning domain model verification techniques undermine the
verification results.
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In this paper, we have discussed the potential deficiencies of this problem
and provided an example of an unreachable counterexample form the literature.
We then introduced goal-constrained verification, a new concept to address this
problem, which restricts the verification task to a specific goal and initial state
pair. This limits counterexamples to those practically reachable by a planner
that is tasked with achieving the goal given the initial state. Consequently, our
method verifies the domain model only wrt. a specific goal and initial state. This
is an acceptable limitation, given that planners also operate on this basis.
We have demonstrated how model checkers and planning techniques can be
used to perform goal-constrained planning domain model verification. In addi-
tion, we have recommended an inherently safe practice for domain model design
that guarantees the safety of domain models “by construction” in case of un-
detected modelling errors. Goal-constrained domain model verification ensures
accurate verification results and complements the inherently safe domain model
design practice to generate safe and error-free planning domain models.
In conclusion, the main message of this paper is that the direct application of
verification algorithms to the planning domain model verification problem can
return counterexamples that would never be reached by planners in real planning
tasks. These unreachable counterexamples can mislead the designers to perform
unnecessary remediations that can be prone to errors. The proposed solution is
simple which makes it readily usable in practice. It is also effective as formally
proven in the paper.
Currently, we are investigating the use of Temporally Extended Goals (TEGs)
translators [23] to perform goal-constrained domain model verification. As future
work, we intend to automate the proposed methods, so that they can be applied
to real-world sized planning domain models. Finally, we would like to perform
an empirical comparison of the proposed methods to assess their scalability and
performance.
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